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par examiner les efforts déployés sur le plan international
pour s’occuper du « terrorisme », la pertinence de la loi
humanitaire internationale dans l’évaluation des actes de
« terreur », et la nature du discours contemporain sur le
terrorisme.  Fut ensuite considérée la façon dont ont évolué
les dispositions courantes concernant la notion d’admissibi-
lité dans la loi canadienne sur l’immigration, avec référence
particulière aux menaces à la sécurité nationale et au
« terrorisme ».
Dans la deuxième partie, l’auteur se penche sur le rôle
joué par la Cour fédérale du Canada dans la légitimation
du plan de sécurité nationale.  Les tensions qui existent
dans la jurisprudence en cours sont examinées à travers une
analyse détaillée de Suresh contre le Ministre de l’immi-
gration et de la citoyenneté, un cas qui est présentement en
instance devant la Cour suprême du Canada. L’article
conclut avec des suggestions pour le rétablissement des
droits de l’homme des réfugiés, tout en sauvegardant
l’intérêt public légitime dans les questions touchant à la
sécurité.
Have not horrors enough been perpetrated in the
name of national security, and in the very countries
from which many asylees come to North America
these days? Are the persecutors going to win by
making us like them?
—C.B. Keely and S.S. Russell1
Abstract
The overarching objective of this paper is to provide a
critical appraisal of the anti-terrorism provisions of Cana-
da’s Immigration Act. The impact of these measures on
refugees is the primary concern of this inquiry, but the
author’s observations are relevant to the situation of other
categories of non-citizens as well. Part 1 of the essay, pub-
lished in the previous issue of Refuge, began by considering
international efforts to address “terrorism,” the relevance of
international humanitarian law to an assessment of acts of
“terror,” and the nature of contemporary discourse on
terrorism. The evolution of the current “admissibility”
provisions in Canadian immigration law was examined
with particular reference to national security threats and
“terrorism.”
In part 2, the author focuses on the role played by
Canada’s Federal Court in legitimizing the national
security scheme. The tensions in the current jurisprudence
are considered with a more in-depth analysis of Suresh v.
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, a case pending
before the Canadian Supreme Court. The paper concludes
with suggestions for restoring human rights for refugees
while safeguarding a genuine public interest in security.
Résumé
Le but suprême de cet article est de proposer une évaluation
critique des provisions antiterroristes de la Loi sur l’immi-
gration du Canada.  L’enquête porte principalement sur
l’impact de ces mesures sur les réfugiés, mais les remarques de
l’auteur sont également pertinentes à la situation d’autres
catégories de non-citoyens.  La première partie de l’article,
parue dans le dernier numéro de Refuge, avait commencé
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The Federal Court is the most active forum for adju-dicating immigration matters,2 with jurisdiction toconsider judicial review applications of refused
refugee claims, the reasonableness (but not the merits) of
inadmissibility decisions of adjudicators and visa officers,
as well as ministerial security certificates, “danger opinions,”
and reports by the Security Intelligence Review Commit-
tee (sirc). The Court also may consider the constitution-
ality of the Immigration Act, either in the context of a sepa-
rate “declaratory action” or in relation to a judicial review
application.3 In the eight years since the “terrorism” provi-
sions of Bill c-86 were first implemented, both the Trial
Division and Court of Appeal have had occasion to apply
them as well as to consider their constitutionality. With few
exceptions, the legislative scheme, the advice provided by
the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (csis) on alleged
members of “terrorist” organizations, and the practices of
government administrators in response have not been sub-
jected to serious scrutiny; constitutional as well as interna-
tional legal standards have been deemed largely irrelevant.
When the spectre of “terrorism” is conjured, government
action tends to be endorsed in decisions that would other-
wise be without legal foundation.4 Judicial deference in this
regard can be viewed in terms of the judiciary’s traditional
reluctance to interfere in legislative or executive decisions
when matters of national security are involved.
In a classic British decision, Lord Denning emphasized
that “[t]he balance between [national security and indi-
vidual freedom] is not for a court of law. It is for the Home
Secretary.”5 This judgment reflects the view that the judici-
ary lacks the institutional competence and expertise to in-
tervene in matters of national security.6 Implicit in such a
view is that questions of national security are inherently
political, as opposed to legal, and are therefore not appro-
priate for adjudication.7 In Canada the Federal Court has
adopted this deferential view in cases of crown privilege
under the Canada Evidence Act. Despite the Act’s implicit
invitation for such claims to be balanced against the public
interest in the administration of justice, where claims of
privilege are asserted on the ground of national security,
Canadian courts consistently treat such claims as conclu-
sive.8 “[T]here can be no public interest greater than na-
tional security . . . ”, the Federal Court has held, asserting
that judges must consider the fact that they “lack expertise
in matters of national defence and international relations.”9
Similarly, in the immigration context, the Federal Court
had been unwilling to apply a human rights lens to the
government’s strategy of deporting “terrorists” who are
deemed to pose a danger to the security of the country.
The judicial approach typically reflects an unwillingness
to scrutinize the interests of national security against the
competing values intrinsic to the rule of law and constitu-
tional democracy. It also belies a clear contradiction. The
denial of institutional competence suggests that the appro-
priate response would require that courts decline to enter-
tain these cases at all, identifying them as non-justiciable.
Rather than following this course, Hanks notes that “the
courts have accepted that, when invoked by the govern-
ment, this undifferentiated term is the solution to the legal
issues before them.”10 He suggests that the judiciary’s fail-
ure to give the concept of national security firm bounda-
ries, and to insist that if it is to have legal consequences, it
must have a meaning, has placed other societal values at
substantial risk. Hanks indicates that these values include
freedom of expression, association, and political activity.11
As we will see in the following sections of this paper, in the
immigration context, the additional value at stake includes
the most basic right of human security.12
The general proclivity of the courts to defer to adminis-
trative decision makers in matters of national security has
been reinforced in immigration cases with a Supreme Court
ruling in 1992. In Chiarelli v. Canada the Court found that
a long-term permanent resident was in Canada on a “con-
tractual” basis, that committing a crime breached that con-
tract and therefore justified deportation.13 Mr. Justice
Sopinka noted that “non-citizens do not have an unquali-
fied right to enter or remain in the country.”14 This com-
ment represents the nadir of judicial recognition of immi-
grant and refugee rights during the last decade and has
served to justify a range of measures that accord non-citi-
zens fewer rights than citizens.15 The discussion that fol-
lows exposes the extent to which such reasoning, applied
in the context of immigration security and refugee exclu-
sion, has produced decisions that are replete with incon-
sistencies and compromise the basic tenets of justice. After
reviewing a representative selection of Federal Court cases
decided after the anti-terrorism amendments were imple-
mented, we will proceed to a more in-depth analysis of
Suresh v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration,16 a case
currently pending before the Supreme Court of Canada.
“Terrorism”: The Play of Meaning and Confusion
In 1996 the Federal Court considered McAllister v. Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration, one of the few occasions in
which a definition of “terrorism” was attempted. Malachy
McAllister was a member of the Irish National Liberation
Army (inla), an organization with a record of violence in
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Northern Ireland. In 1988 he came to Canada seeking pro-
tection as a refugee. Pursuant to the access criteria that were
in effect by the time his case was processed, the Minister
determined that it “would be contrary to the public inter-
est” to have McAllister’s refugee claim determined and thus
he was barred from proceeding with his claim. His appli-
cation for judicial review of these decisions was dismissed
with the following explanation:
. . . it is to be noted that the Immigration Act . . . does not make
membership in an organization unlawful in Canada. It does
preclude admission to Canada of those who are found to be
members of an organization that on reasonable grounds is
found to have been or is engaged in terrorism. It applies in
the case of foreign nationals, who have no right to enter or
remain in Canada except as the Act permits.17
Mr. Justice McKay referred to a dictionary definition of
terrorism and suggested that the term referred to all forms
of terror and violence to intimidate in order to achieve a
political objective. Borricand would not have approved,
given the tautology inherent in defining terrorism by the
terror it causes.18 The Court commented further,
In an era when much attention on the international level, and
within many countries, has been and continues to be given to
containing, restricting and punishing acts of terrorism, I am
not persuaded that the word can be considered so vague as to
be devoid of sufficient certainty of meaning, or that applica-
tion of the provision would present uncertainty. The word is
recognizable to individuals, as it apparently was to Mr.
McAllister in this case, and to those concerned with applying
the Act.19
McAllister, himself, had accepted that his organization
had committed “terrorist” acts but contested the Act’s in-
clusion of such vague and imprecise terminology as a bar
to claiming refugee status. It is interesting to contrast this
decision with the Supreme Court’s ruling a few years ear-
lier in R. v. Morales on the Criminal Code’s use of the term
public interest as a criterion for denying bail in pre-trial
detention.20 The Court found a clause in the Code uncon-
stitutional because it authorized detention using terms that
were vague and imprecise and thus resulted in a denial of
bail without just cause. While agreeing that preventing
crime and interference with the administration of justice
were important, the means adopted by the government had
to be proportional and rationally connected to the legisla-
tive objective. Applying the term public interest would au-
thorize pre-trial detention in many cases unrelated to the
objectives of the measure. The Supreme Court emphasized
that statutory terms must be capable of framing the legal
debate in a meaningful manner and structuring discretion.
In McAllister, the Federal Court refused to apply these prin-
ciples, suggesting that a statute applicable to a criminal ac-
cused who faced a prospect of a serious penalty and denial
of liberty, was distinguishable from provisions in the Im-
migration Act that applied to persons who had no right to
remain in Canada and were seeking the benefit of a discre-
tionary remedy. In such circumstances, the Court asserted
that greater “caution” was appropriate. It is notable that a
few months earlier, Mr. Justice McKay employed a very dif-
ferent conceptual lens in Al Yamani v. Canada, a judicial
review application brought by a stateless man of Palestin-
ian origin who had been living in Canada as a permanent
resident since 1985.21
Counsel for Issam Al Yamani raised a number of consti-
tutional issues with regard to a sirc report and the result-
ing security certificate that was issued against him. The re-
port was based on csis allegations that Al Yamani was a
member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Pales-
tine (pflp), a “terrorist” organization, likely to engage in
acts of violence that might endanger the lives or safety of
persons in Canada. Mr. Justice MacKay agreed with one of
Al Yamani’s arguments, namely that proscribing mere
membership in an organization that is likely to engage in
violence, regardless of the obligations of membership, the
range of the organization’s other activities, or the influ-
ence the individual may exercise in the organization, di-
rectly violates freedom of association. The Court noted that
“the freedoms assured by section 2 of the Charter are for
‘everyone,’ for the permanent resident as for the citizen in
Canada.”22 The Court found that the sirc report could not
stand in view of this constitutional violation, and conse-
quently the matter was remitted for reconsideration.23 In
contrast to the case of McAllister, the Court emphasized
the need for personal involvement.
The Al Yamani decision is consistent with American
Supreme Court cases dealing with anti-Communist legis-
lation of the 1950s. In Apethekar v. Secretary of State, for
example, the Court found that a law prohibiting members
of “Communist-action organizations” from applying for
passports was unconstitutional because it deprived mem-
bers of their constitutional right to travel, without consid-
ering whether or not they were active members or were
engaging in unlawful activities.24 Similarly in Robel, the
Court struck down a law prohibiting any member of a
Communist-action organization from working in a gov-
ernment defence facility, because it swept indiscriminately
across all types of association, without regard for the qual-
ity and degree of membership.25 In Al Yamani the issue was
membership in an organization “likely to engage in vio-
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lence.” The same logic has not been applied, however, in
subsequent cases dealing with membership in organiza-
tions likely to engage in “terrorism.”
In Re Baroud, for example, the Federal Court consid-
ered the reasonableness of a security certificate issued
against a Palestinian refugee claimant who had acknowl-
edged that he was a former intelligence officer in the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization (plo), an organization that
the Minister characterized as having engaged in “terror-
ism.” In upholding the Minister’s certificate, the designated
judge indicated that the term terrorist is one that need not
be defined. Mr. Justice Denault agreed that there were no
reasonable grounds to believe Wahid Khalil Baroud him-
self actually engaged in “terrorism.” It was noted that
Baroud had participated in “armed activities”—which did
not constitute “terrorism.” However, in light of intelligence
information about other practices carried out by Fatah and
Force 17, the specific groups to which csis alleged Baroud
belonged, the security certificate was reasonable.
The Court commented,
I am mindful of the fact that the terms “terrorism” and “ter-
rorist” are not defined in the Act. Counsel for the Ministers
affirms in her written memorandum that ‘Like beauty, the
image of a terrorist is, to some extent, in the eye of the be-
holder.’ While I accept this statement in general terms, it can-
not prevent this court from examining whether, in the cir-
cumstances of this case, there are reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that a person or organizations have engaged in terrorism.26
It deserves mention that Baroud’s reason for seeking
asylum in Canada was that, as a plo renegade, he feared
for his life in the Middle East. He had disobeyed an order
from the plo hierarchy to proceed to Iraqi-occupied Ku-
wait during the Gulf War to assist Iraqi authorities. His
disobedience of the official order resulted in his immedi-
ate dismissal from the plo. As Whitaker reports, his stated
reason was principled: as a Palestinian, a man whose home-
land was under foreign occupation, he would not help an-
other occupying power.27 When his case was considered by
the Federal Court, no evidence was presented that Baroud
himself posed a specific threat to any nation. Furthermore,
the plo was no longer considered a “terrorist” organiza-
tion, even by the Israeli government. From this judgment
we can infer that the Court is defending an almost unlim-
ited right of the government to define the scope of national
security, in the absence of any connection between the
impact of a refugee’s conduct and the welfare of either the
host country or other nations.28 After a lengthy detention
in a Toronto jail, Baroud was deported to Sudan.
In a similar vein, in Husein v. Canada the Court upheld
an adjudicator’s order that the applicant was inadmissible
based on his membership in the Oromo Liberation Front
(olf). The Court’s reasons disclose no analysis of the de-
gree and nature of Fahmi Husein’s personal involvement
in the organization, referring only to the adjudicator’s find-
ings that olf was an organization engaged in “terrorism”
because its leaders had set fire to a village, killing 144 indi-
viduals, and had attacked another location, forcing indi-
viduals to jump off cliffs. These two incidents resulted in
the deaths of several hundred people and therefore pro-
vided sufficient basis to characterize the olf as an organi-
zation engaged in “terrorism.” The Court stated,
Terrorist organizations are not organized states or corpora-
tions where the niceties of agency law are applicable. Terror-
ist organizations are loosely structured groups. Even if I were
to accept that an act carried out by an individual might not
be attributed to an organization, where there is evidence that
the leaders of an organization are involved in the acts of ter-
rorism, I have no doubt that for purposes of subparagraph
19(1)(f)(iii)(B), there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the organization itself is involved in acts of terrorism.29
The case of Canada v. Iqbal Singh concerned an Indian
national who had been the organizing secretary of a Sikh
student federation and spoke out against injustices perpe-
trated against the Sikh population by the Indian govern-
ment.30 He had been arrested and tortured by Indian au-
thorities and ultimately fled to Canada in 1991, where he
was recognized as a Convention refugee. Singh was subject
to a security certificate on the basis of his involvement with
the Babar Khalsa (bk) and Babar Khalsa International (bki),
which the Court noted originated as Sikh organizations
engaged in “activism against the Indian government,” were
involved in a range of humanitarian activities, but were
also responsible for setting off bombs and killing innocent
people. All of the open evidence against Singh dealt with
his “close association” with leaders of the bk and his ac-
knowledged financial assistance to a number of its repre-
sentatives, including a person known to have been involved
in a previous hijacking.
The Court upheld the security certificate on the basis
that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the bk
and bki have engaged in “terrorism” and that Singh was a
member of these groups. Mr. Justice Rothstein referred to
testimony provided by the Director of Internal Policy for
the Department of Employment and Immigration given
in 1992 before a parliamentary committee, to the effect that
the intent in drafting the subsections was to define mem-
bership broadly, leaving a discretion with the Minister to
provide an exemption in circumstances where, in the Min-
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ister’s opinion, it would not be detrimental to the national
interest. He concludes,
The provisions deal with subversion and terrorism. The con-
text in immigration legislation is public safety and national
security, the most serious concerns of government. It is trite
to say that terrorist organizations do not issue membership
cards. There is no formal test for membership and members
are not therefore easily identifiable . . . I think it is obvious
that Parliament intended the term “member” to be given an
unrestricted and broad interpretation. I find no support for
the view that a person is not a member as contemplated by
the provision if he or she became a member after the organi-
zation stopped engaging in terrorism. If such membership is
benign, the Minister has discretion to exclude the individual
from the operation of the provision.31
The Court’s discussion of membership is very much at
odds with the interpretive principles that inform refugee
status determination and the application of the criminality
related “exclusion clauses.” In that context, the Federal
Court has recognized that mere association with—or mem-
bership in—a group that commits acts of the type con-
templated by sections 19(1)(e) and (f) is not in itself suffi-
cient to warrant exclusion. One of the leading exclusion
cases is Ramirez v. Minister of Employment and Immigra-
tion, which involved a sergeant in the Salvadoran army
during the 1980s.32 The Federal Court of Appeal upheld the
decision of the Refugee Board that Ramirez should be ex-
cluded, based on his “personal and knowing” involvement
in a military force that routinely tortured prisoners to ex-
tract information.33 However, the Court emphasized that
mere presence at the scene of an offence is insufficient to
qualify as personal and knowing participation. Only “where
an organization is principally directed to a limited brutal
purpose, such as a secret police activity, mere membership
may by necessity involve personal and knowing participa-
tion in persecutorial acts.”34 Applying the same logic in the
case of Moreno v. Canada, the Court found that a young
man who had been forcibly conscripted and had deserted
at the first possible opportunity after learning that the army
practiced torture, should not be subject to exclusion.35 In
the circumstances of this case the Court identified the key
issue as whether José Rodolfo Moreno’s membership in the
Salvadoran army—an organization responsible for inhu-
mane acts against members of the civilian population—in
and of itself, was sufficient justification for invoking the
exclusion clause. Citing Ramirez, Mr. Justice Robertson noted,
[I]t is well settled that mere membership in an organization
involved in international offences is not sufficient basis on
which to invoke the exclusion clause . . . An exception to this
general rule arises where the organization is one whose very
existence is premised on achieving political or social ends by
any means deemed necessary. Membership in a secret police
force may be deemed sufficient grounds for invoking the ex-
clusion clause . . . Membership in a military organization in-
volved in armed conflict with guerrilla forces comes within
the ambit of the general rule and not the exception.36
Both cases made extensive reference to domestic and
international criminal law standards for the purposes of
“direction.” In Moreno, the Federal Court of Appeal cited
the Supreme Court’s majority judgment in a sexual assault
case in which the offence of aiding and abetting was con-
sidered, underscoring the need for evidence of “prior
knowledge of the principal offender’s intention to commit
the offence . . . and a positive act or omission to facilitate
the unlawful purpose.”37
In Balta v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, the
Federal Court reviewed a decision of the Refugee Board
that had described the Serbian army as a “terrorist” organi-
zation. The Court questioned whether the Board could rea-
sonably draw such a conclusion and whether the applicant
was a personal and knowing participant. Mr. Justice
Rothstein elaborated:
In Ramirez, Mr. Justice MacGuigan recognized that some
groups might be established or operated with the sole intent
and purpose of violently and brutally bringing about a course
of events. Is the particular goal of the Serbian army the com-
mission of international crimes? While I do not dispute that
atrocities are being committed in Bosnia by Serbian forces, I
cannot agree, that based on the evidence before them, the
Board correctly characterized a national army as a ‘terrorist
organization.’ While the Serbian army may be utilizing ter-
rorist means to achieve political ends, I think it is significant
that there are political ends, namely Serbian control of Bosnia.38
The Court’s analysis suggests there should be a distinc-
tion made between an organization that may engage in “ter-
rorist” practices versus an organization that is “terrorist”—
and that a relevant factor in this regard is the organiza-
tion’s overall purpose.39 Implicit in this brief passage is an
inference that any national army, regardless of its charac-
ter, would be exempt from proscription. Mr. Justice
Rothstein’s reasons appear to contradict Ramirez and
Moreno by justifying differential treatment for state and
non-state actors. On the specific questions of complicity
and membership, however, all three cases are fully consist-
ent with unhcr Guidelines on Exclusion.40 Although State
practice is not uniform, most countries have recognized
that mere membership in an organization is not sufficient
basis on which to exclude.41 A recent House of Lords deci-
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sion in the United Kingdom, for example, held that per-
sons may not be excluded from the Convention merely
because they or their acts or their organizations have been
labelled “terrorist.”42 The judgment emphasized the impor-
tance of assessing personal responsibility for excludable
crimes. For Iqbal Singh, however, Mr. Justice Rothstein
chose not to follow his own reasoning in Balta. Perhaps
the Court viewed the rights-based underpinnings of refu-
gee law, in which the exclusion clauses represent a narrow
exception to protection, as incompatible with the broader
exclusion criteria in section 19, which are rooted in the char-
acterization of immigration as a privilege rather than a
right. In any event, questions about Singh’s actual knowl-
edge and involvement in the acts alleged to constitute “ter-
rorism” were deemed irrelevant. Indeed, based on Justice
Rothstein’s analysis, we see that the “terrorism” provisions
apply equally to the person who ceased his or her mem-
bership before the acts occurred or became a member af-
ter the acts occurred but without knowledge of their oc-
currence. Recourse to the principles developed in the ex-
clusion jurisprudence would have provided the Court with
a much more coherent framework within which to analyze
both the nature of the bk and bki, as well as the degree of
Singh’s involvement. Singh’s financial contributions would
be assessed from the standpoint that the organizations at
issue had political objectives, were engaged in a range of
activities, and could not be characterized as groups with a
“single brutal purpose”—all facts that can be inferred from
the Court’s decision.
Aynur Saygili, a Kurdish refugee claimant, was a politi-
cal activist whom csis alleged had been sent to Canada by
the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (pkk) to “gain control of the
general Canadian Kurdish community.”43 Saygili was de-
ported because the Federal Court upheld the Ministers’
opinion that she was a member of the pkk—a “terrorist”
organization. In his brief reasons, Mr. Justice Cullen justi-
fied his ruling on two grounds: that Saygili had lied about
her real name and itinerary to Canada and that her involve-
ment in the Kurdish Community Association of Montreal
was “ . . . more than that of a passive person, even to deliv-
ering speeches apparently prepared by one of her hosts.”44
The Court cited evidence of conditions in Turkey and the
nature of the pkk, referring specifically to an expert’s testi-
mony on the cultural genocide perpetrated against the
Kurds by the Turkish state, the 4,000 Kurdish villages that
had been levelled in the previous three to four years, and
the sympathy for the nationalist struggle shared by all
Kurds. What the Court would not consider was whether
the conditions in Turkey gave rise to a right to armed re-
sistance on the part of the pkk. Nor was there was any dis-
cussion of the pkk’s command structure and the presence
of a distinct political wing that had as its mandate the pro-
motion of Kurdish nationalism through political means.
The nature and degree of personal and knowing participa-
tion in unlawful acts on the part of other members of the
Kurdish Community Association and Saygili herself, either
in Canada or abroad, was not relevant. In this regard, it
was not alleged that Saygili’s role within the pkk was as an
executive member or senior leader. Saygili’s speeches at the
community centre were sufficient to establish her culpa-
bility—effectively “guilt by association.”45
Courts have legitimately recognized that certain forms
of speech do not deserve constitutional protection because
of the harm they engender, that there may be some limit
on expressive rights when, for example, expression involves
direct physical harm.46 The application of this standard has
not prevented citizens in Canada from expressing support
for nato’s high-altitude bombing campaign in Yugoslavia
in 1999 or, more recently, the violence that has accompa-
nied the Al Aqsa Intifada in Israel/Palestine. Apparently,
pure political speech, a sacrosanct freedom in Canada, is a
right that must be exercised with extreme caution by refu-
gees and other non-citizens. Mr. Justice Cullen cited an Am-
nesty International report as evidence that the pkk was re-
sponsible for politically motivated violence in Turkey, but
no attempt was made to establish any connection between
Saygili and pkk-sponsored violence. The nature of the
Court’s limited jurisdiction in reviewing whether or not it
was reasonable for the security certificate to be issued, rather
than the actual merits of doing so, meant that Turkey’s
abysmal human rights record on its Kurdish minority, re-
ported in the same Amnesty document, and what would
happen to Saygili if she was returned there, were beyond
the Court’s purview.
In Re Ahani, the designated judge considered the rea-
sonableness of a security certificate that had been issued
against a Convention refugee from Iran.47 Mr. Justice
Denault upheld the certificate, agreeing with the csis alle-
gations that there were reasonable grounds to believe, inter
alia, that Mansour Ahani was a member of the Iranian
Ministry of Intelligence Security (mois), an agency that
sponsors assassinations of political dissidents worldwide.
The Court found that the case, at its heart, turned on
Ahani’s credibility, which, according to Mr. Justice Denault,
was completely lacking. Without access to the intelligence
reports on which the Court’s assessment of credibility was
based, it is impossible for an observer to assess the merits
of the decision. In common with most security cases, the
122
Volume 19 Refuge Number 4
judgments themselves never disclose a detailed analysis of
the allegations and evidence, because that information has
been received in secret, in the absence of the person con-
cerned and his or her lawyer, on the grounds that it would
be injurious to national security or persons (i.e., the in-
formants). Nevertheless, critical examination of the
premises upon which the credibility determination rests is
possible. In this respect, the Court’s statements on the in-
terpretation of the language in section 19 of the Act are
worth reproducing:
In my view, since Parliament has decided not to define these
terms, it is not incumbent upon this Court to define them . . .
I do not share the view that the word [“member”] must be
narrowly interpreted. I am rather of the view that it must re-
ceive a broad and unrestricted interpretation. As to the word
“terrorism,” while I agree with counsel for the Respondent
that the word is not capable of a legal definition that would
be neutral and non-discriminatory in its application, I am
still of the opinion that the word must receive an unrestricted
interpretation.48
Mr. Justice Denault’s conclusion that a word not capa-
ble of legal definition and non-discriminatory application
should nevertheless be applied, and further, applied expan-
sively, is inconsistent with the equality guarantees of the
Charter of Rights, and the rule of law more broadly.49 In
other contexts, the Supreme Court has recognized that
while legislatures inevitably draw distinctions among the
governed, “such distinctions should not bring about or re-
inforce the disadvantage of certain groups and individuals
by denying them the rights freely accorded to others.”50
Following the Court’s ruling, Ahani was ordered deported,
and the Minister issued a “danger opinion,” which indi-
cated that he could be returned to Iran, a country where he
faced only “minimal risk.” Ahani is in his seventh year of
detention in Canada and has continued his efforts to have
his deportation order rescinded.51 Ahani’s case is currently
pending before the Supreme Court and will be heard in
May 2001, along with Suresh v. Canada, considered below.
The Suresh Case: Human Rights or Comity and
Complicity?
The case of Manickavasagam Suresh engages all of the
themes addressed in this paper concerning the role of the
law in constructing refugees as “terrorists.” For this reason,
the proceedings in Suresh will be examined in somewhat
greater depth—albeit with a discrete focus on “terrorism”—
rather than the broader constitutional questions that will
be canvassed before the Supreme Court.52
Suresh is a Tamil man of Sri Lankan origin who was
recognized as a Convention refugee in Canada in 1991.
During his time in Canada he worked as a co-ordinator for
the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils (fact),
a non-profit corporation registered in Ontario, and as
fundraising co-ordinator with the World Tamil Movement
(wtm). fact is engaged in advocacy in support of Tamil
self-determination in Sri Lanka as well as a range of com-
munity activities and government-funded settlement serv-
ices. wtm is a member agency of fact and supports a com-
munity centre, library, educational program in Tamil cul-
ture and language, and vocational training. wtm also pub-
lishes a weekly newspaper. Suresh’s involvement in these
organizations resulted in the filing of a security certificate
against him alleging that he was described in three of the
inadmissible classes within section 19: persons who have
engaged in “terrorism” as well as past and present mem-
bers of organizations engaging in “terrorism.”
Mr. Justice Teitelbaum upheld the reasonableness of the
security certificate, finding that Suresh was a long-time
member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (ltte) in
Sri Lanka, became part of its executive, and continues to
be a member in Canada; that he obtained refugee status by
“wilful misrepresentation of the facts”; that the wtm is part
of the ltte or “at least an organization that supports the
ltte”; and finally, that there were reasonable grounds to
believe the ltte has engaged in “terrorist” acts.53 In the
course of the hearing, counsel for Suresh called a series of
witnesses and international legal experts to address the
character of the ongoing conflict in Sri Lanka, the human
rights situation in that country with respect to the Tamil
minority, whether the Tamils were a “People” for the pur-
poses of international humanitarian law, and whether their
character as a group, as well as the conditions they faced in
Sri Lanka, gave them a right to resort to force. Evidence
was provided by Dr. Richard Falk, and Professors Jordan
Paust and Craig Scott, among others. Much of the testi-
mony elaborated on themes considered in part 1 of this
paper.
In a nutshell, there was a consensus among the experts
who had been called for Suresh that the Tamil minority in
Sri Lanka fulfill the criteria for recognition as a “People”
with a right to self-determination. The experts supported
the conclusion that the ltte is a national liberation move-
ment within the meaning of international humanitarian
law and that the treatment of the Tamils by the national
government in Sri Lanka gave rise to the right to armed
resistance against a “racist regime,” as a matter of custom-
ary international law.54 Based on the foregoing principles,
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counsel for Suresh argued that the list of “terrorist” inci-
dents that csis alleged were committed by the ltte have to
be viewed as allegations of violations of the laws of war
(not “terrorism”); and that the evidence provided by csis,
primarily press reports, disclosed insufficient information
from which to draw conclusions about the nature of the
acts committed—including whether the acts constituted
reprisals, and whether civilian casualties were incidental to
a military attack or not. Submissions were made with re-
gard on the definitional problems associated with “terror-
ism,” “engaged or engaging,” and “membership,” and the
application of constitutional norms to these issues.55
In a relatively brief judgment, the security certificate is-
sued against Suresh was upheld. The Court dispensed with
all the arguments on the relevance of international humani-
tarian law to an assessment of the Sri Lankan conflict and
the characterization of the ltte, by deeming these issues
irrelevant. In a brief remark, Mr. Justice Teitelbaum stated,
witnesses called by Suresh denied most of these incidents as
being “terrorist” in nature as, it is alleged, the ltte can be
considered freedom fighters, and therefore have the “right” to
shoot at soldiers or persons who do not support the ltte and
their aims. With respect, I disagree.56
The Court supported this perspective by reference to
incidents of violent attacks on political representatives,
police, and civilians that had been attributed to the ltte,
but it failed to address any of the contextual issues that an
assessment of violations in the midst of an ongoing con-
flict would necessarily require. In contrast to the Court’s
judgment in Re Baroud, which found that all forms of per-
sonal involvement in violence were not necessarily “terror-
ism,” Mr. Justice Teitelbaum made no distinction between
attacks on military sites versus those that target civilians.
In a classic invocation of the limits of judicial competence
in political questions, he suggested that such an analysis
would require the Court to resolve “political issues that exist
between groups of peoples in another country” and that
. . . [i]t is not my function as a judge of the Federal Court . . .
to determine, based on the evidence before me, whether the
Tamil people in Sri Lanka should or should not be granted
their own homeland or even to express an opinion on that
subject. That is a political question to be determined by the
people of Sri Lanka, together with the help of the United Na-
tions and other nations of goodwill.57
Yet an assessment of conduct in the course of a libera-
tion or secessionist struggle is very much a legal issue. As
discussed earlier, such an assessment involves questions that
should be guided by the comprehensive scheme of ihl,
which has been directly incorporated into Canadian law.
Arguably it is precisely the failure to apply legal norms to
an analysis of the nature of particular non-state actors and
their conduct that politicizes the judicial role in these cases.
While it must be acknowledged that the application of ihl
standards may have political consequences, the Courts are
frequently involved in balancing competing interests with
explicit political, economic, and social dimensions.58 From
foreign policy, missile testing, abortion, and the Secession
Reference, to the language of signs, the funding of educa-
tion and pay equity, the right to life and the right to death,
Canadian courts directly engage with a broad spectrum of
political issues and have attempted, albeit with varying
degrees of success, to resolve these questions within the
rubric of law and principle.59 Viewed in this light, judicial
deference in the name of protecting Canada from “terror-
ism” reinforces the dominant discourses that have cast the
refugee as a threat to order, and as Whitaker suggests, the
“focal point for countermeasures to ‘stem the tide.’”60 The
Court’s surrender becomes a political act of state legitima-
tion, compromising the very tenets judges are entrusted to
uphold.
In the absence of statutory criteria defining membership
and terrorism, Mr. Justice Teitelbaum could have ensured
that those terms were interpreted in a manner consistent
with the Geneva Conventions Act as well as the Charter
and international human rights law. The Court could have
read into the law the presumption that Parliament did not
intend those terms to be interpreted by either ministers or
judges in an unconstitutional manner, in a way that would
sweep within its ambit advocacy and fundraising efforts in
support of lawful activities and, indeed, fundamental hu-
man rights.61
Another reasonable course of action could have been to
find that the absence of definitional criteria renders non-
discriminatory application of the law impossible (as Mr.
Justice Denault noted in Ahani) and that therefore the Min-
ister’s decision could not be upheld. In other contexts, the
courts have recognized the disadvantage suffered by non-
citizens in Canada.62 The courts have also held that seem-
ingly neutral laws that affect a person or group in a man-
ner related to their personal characteristics is an affront to
the values of equality and human dignity.63 Indeed, the right
to equality enshrined in the Charter has been described as
the “broadest of all guarantees” that applies to and sup-
ports all other rights.64 In Re Suresh we are advised instead
that the law must be interpreted through the “eyes of a
Canadian” and that ministerial discretion to interpret
“membership in a terrorist organization” should be unre-
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stricted. The irony is that the refugees and immigrants most
affected by the law are very often from countries with the
worst records on human rights. In this case we can see how
the Court’s judgment lends legitimacy to the efforts of the
Sri Lankan government to suppress a secessionist struggle
borne of fundamental deprivations and human rights
abuse. Mr. Justice Teitelbaum stated,
I am satisfied that there is no need to define the word “terror-
ism.” When one sees a “terrorist act” one is able to define the
word. When one sees a bomb placed in a public market fre-
quented by civilians and the bomb causes death and injury,
one is able to see a “terrorist act” or what is referred to as
“terrorism.” The word need not be defined. As I have stated,
one can see a “terrorist act” and, I am satisfied, the “act” must
be seen through the eyes of a Canadian . . . [t]he term “terror-
ism” or a “terrorist act,” I am satisfied must receive a wide and
unrestricted interpretation . . . 65
In contrast to the decisions on complicity in the context
of refugee exclusion (Ramirez, Moreno, and Balta) and the
judgment in Al Yamani, which distinguished between sup-
port activities and personal involvement, in Re Suresh we
see that all forms of conduct in support of an organization
deemed to be engaging in “terrorism,” in the absence of
any nexus between the support activities and acts of vio-
lence, is “terrorism.” The Court need not have found that
the ltte was a national liberation movement for the pur-
poses of absolving Suresh (although the preponderance of
evidence suggests otherwise). Further, the Court need not
have discounted evidence of serious human rights viola-
tions that have been committed by members of the ltte
during the seventeen-year conflict in Sri Lanka. Indeed,
Amnesty International has consistently documented vio-
lations of international humanitarian principles by both
sides in the conflict.66 Rather, the Court could have relied
on evidence of the organization’s conventional combat ac-
tivity as well as its humanitarian and relief activities in sup-
port of internally displaced Tamils and its status as a de
facto government in areas of the country within its con-
trol, to conclude that the ltte was not an organization with
a “limited brutal purpose,” such that someone engaged in
fundraising and political advocacy should be effectively
criminalized for whatever acts of violence members of the
group may initiate.67
Subsequent to the Court’s decision upholding the rea-
sonableness of the security certificate, the Minister gave
notice that she was considering the option of declaring
Suresh a danger to the security of Canada and that she
would be assessing the risk that he represented for the Ca-
nadian public and the possible risks to which he would be
exposed if returned to Sri Lanka. Pursuant to the proce-
dures set out in the Act, Suresh had fifteen days to respond
to the Minster’s notice. Documentation submitted on his
behalf included extensive evidence of human rights abuses,
including torture in detention and extra-judicial executions,
committed by Sri Lankan security forces against Tamils.
The human rights reports confirmed that most of the tor-
ture victims were “Tamils suspected of being ltte-
insurgent collaborators.” There was evidence submitted
confirming that Suresh personally would be at serious risk
if returned to Sri Lanka, in particular as a Canadian-
certified “terrorist.” A letter from Amnesty International
emphasized the non-derogable nature of Canada’s obliga-
tions under the cat and indicated that “[a]pplying the lan-
guage of article 3 to Mr. Suresh, Amnesty International be-
lieves ‘there are substantial grounds for believing that he
would be in danger of torture’ if he were returned to Sri
Lanka.”68 The department analyst who reviewed the case
recommended that the Minister issue a danger opinion
against Suresh, noting,
. . . on balance there are insufficient humanitarian and com-
passionate considerations present to warrant extraordinary
consideration. It is difficult, however to assess the treatment
reserved for Mr. Suresh upon his return to Sri Lanka. Given
his high profile in the Canadian Tamil Community and in-
ternational media, we feel that this will likely mitigate any
harsh sanctions taken against him by Sri Lankan authorities.
Furthermore, while we acknowledge that there is a risk to Mr.
Suresh on his return to Sri Lanka, this is counterbalanced by
the serious terrorist activities to which he is a party, commit-
ted while abusing Canada’s protection and freedom.69
The Minister issued the danger opinion and took steps
to arrange for his deportation. A judicial review applica-
tion in the Trial Division and a subsequent appeal, chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the terrorism and
refoulement subsections as well as the Minister’s exercise of
discretion in the circumstances of the case, were both un-
successful.70 From the wide-ranging legal and constitutional
issues arising from the judgment by the Federal Court of
Appeal, a few points warrant particular mention for our
inquiry.
First, none of the human rights reports available at the
time the analyst wrote his report or today lend any sup-
port to his contention that a “high profile” would mitigate
against harsh treatment.71 It is notable that just a few months
after the analyst completed his memorandum, the Cana-
dian government was involved in a sophisticated interdic-
tion action involving a boat of 192 Tamil asylum-seekers
bound for Europe. Canadian interdiction policies are the
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mirror image of anti-terrorist laws: both serve to control
access to asylum. In this case a boat was tracked and inter-
cepted off the coast of Senegal. None of the passengers were
properly interviewed to determine whether they would be
at any risk if returned to Sri Lanka.72 Summarily described
as “economic migrants,” they were encouraged to consent
to “voluntary” repatriation under the watchful eyes of Ca-
nadian officials. All of the Tamils were arrested upon ar-
rival back to Sri Lanka and held in detention for several
weeks. One of these individuals was rearrested one month
later and brutally tortured on the pretext of his alleged in-
volvement in the ltte. 73 Two years later, representatives
for the Canadian government still speak of their “success”
in safeguarding Canada from illegal migration.74 Neither
the attention the case attracted (two bulletins by Amnesty
International), nor the direct involvement of the Canadian
government in the operation and subsequent monitoring
in Sri Lanka, prevented this atrocity from happening. The
most recent human rights reports confirm that “[d]espite
legal prohibitions, the security forces and police continue
to torture and mistreat persons in police custody and pris-
ons, particularly Tamils suspected of supporting the ltte,”
and that “torture continues with relative impunity.”75 The
U.S. State Department report for 2000 indicates that
[m]ethods of torture included electric shock, beatings (espe-
cially on the soles of the feet), suspension by the wrists or feet
in contorted positions, burning, slamming testicles in desk
drawers, and near drownings. In other cases, victims must
remain in unnatural positions for extended periods, or they
have bags laced with insecticide, chilli powder, or gasoline
placed over their heads. Detainees have reported broken bones
and other serious injuries as a result of their mistreatment.76
A second observation concerns the Court of Appeal’s tex-
tual analysis of the relevant international human rights trea-
ties. In dismissing Suresh’s appeal, the Court engaged in
interpretive gymnastics with regard to the requirements of
the applicable treaties. As emphasized in the Supreme Court
ruling in Pushpanathan, provisions that disentitle a person
to human rights protection should be read narrowly.77 The
Federal Court did precisely the opposite by attempting to
find support for the proposed deportation, where none
actually existed, in the text of the treaties. Mr. Justice
Robertson suggested that the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights enunciates a non-derogable pro-
hibition on torture that is geographically restricted to con-
duct within a state’s jurisdiction; that its ambit does not
extend to expulsion or extradition.78 The fact that the un
Human Rights Committee’s own guidelines directly con-
tradict such an interpretation did not dissuade the Court
from this view.79 The Court proceeded to infer that dero-
gation from the Convention against Torture’s prohibition
against refoulement to torture was contemplated because
article 3 contained no reference to a non-derogation re-
quirement (although the plain language is mandatory: “no
State Party shall expel, return . . . ”). The next leap was to
article 16 of the Convention, which addresses the circum-
stances where references to torture can be read to include
“cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”
and to provide broader protection by explicitly indicating
that the Convention’s provisions are without prejudice to
guarantees afforded in other international instruments. The
Court inferred from this article that since the Refugee Con-
vention permits refoulement pursuant to the security ex-
ception of article 33.2, the Convention against Torture
should be interpreted to include the very same exception.
Yet this reading directly contradicts the Convention’s own
preamble as well as decisions of the Committee Against
Torture and the European Court of Human Rights.80
The Court agreed that a breach of fundamental justice
had been occasioned by procedures that permitted the
Minister to deport “a suspected terrorist” where there were
substantial grounds for believing that refoulement would
expose the person to a risk of torture. However, this was a
reasonable limitation in view of the security interests at
stake. One might legitimately wonder how such action can
be reconciled with the Court’s conclusion that Suresh him-
self had not committed any crimes in Canada, nor had he
engaged in any “terrorist” activity in Sri Lanka. Indeed, in
reasons granting an earlier interlocutory order, Mr. Justice
Robertson stated,
What is clear is that Mr. Suresh has not committed any acts of
violence in Canada. He is being deported largely because he is
the leader of a Canadian organization which raises financial
aid for a terrorist organization, namely, the ltte. In short,
there is no evidence to support a valid concern that Mr.
Suresh’s presence in Canada represents a threat to the per-
sonal safety of Canadians.81
Even if one were to accept that the human rights treaties
permit states to balance competing interests in cases of
refoulement to torture (which they do not), there is an ut-
ter lack of proportionality between the law’s legislative
purpose of general deterrence—ensuring that Canada does
not become “a safe haven for terrorists,” and the means in-
voked, when a person who poses no threat is refouled to a
risk of torture. When the constitutional rights of citizens
are at stake, the government is held to a more rigorous test
in order to defend the proposed action.82 For a non-citizen,
the most basic right to security of the person will be com-
126
Volume 19 Refuge Number 4
promised in the name of safeguarding the “security of
Canada.” Perversely, the Court appeals to the need to fos-
ter comity among nations—to ensure that Canada “lives
up to its international commitment to fight terrorism,” as
an additional benefit of the law, while rejecting the very
same internationalism to promote human rights.83 It is
noteworthy that the government itself is on record sug-
gesting that the fight against “terrorism” must be consist-
ent with the broader commitments to human rights and
the rule of law; that the institutions entrusted to fight “ter-
rorism” would attract public support by respecting those
principles.84
Third, the Court’s judgment conflates “terrorism” with
crimes against humanity. It is suggested that “[n]o one
questions the right to use force in seeking political inde-
pendence so long as the struggle is between two combat-
ants.” However, we are told,
. . . a line separating acceptable means of protest from unac-
ceptable means must be drawn somewhere. In my view ter-
rorism is an unacceptable means of attempting to effect po-
litical change… I accept that nations may be unable to reach
a consensus as to the exact definition of terrorism. But this
cannot be taken to mean that there is common ground with
respect to certain types of conduct. At the very least, I cannot
conceive of anyone seriously challenging the belief that kill-
ing innocent civilians, that is crimes against humanity, does
not constitute terrorism.85
The terrorist is now reconceived as the criminal against
humanity—a term that actually has legal content and
meaning, from its codification in the Charter of Nurem-
berg to its more recent applications by the ad hoc tribunals
for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and in the Rome Statute.86 It
may indeed be the case that members of the ltte have com-
mitted such crimes, but justice would not tolerate a trial in
absentia—nor would it implicate everyone in a leadership
position without reference to the context of the conflict or
degree of personal responsibility.87 Apart from decisions
of the Federal Court, none of the ill-fated efforts to define
“terrorism” have ever suggested an equivalence with crimes
against humanity. Such a suggestion is offensive in the con-
text of the Sri Lankan conflict, where daily reports of hu-
man rights violations committed by the state as part of a
systemic, deliberate policy of race-based persecution far
outstrip the crimes of the Tamil Tigers, whose fundamen-
tal objective concerns a legitimate right of self-determination.88
While we share the same horror as the Court over atroci-
ties committed against innocent people, the suggestion that
Suresh’s conduct could ever be equated with crimes against
humanity trivializes the massive brutalities of the past cen-
tury—from the Nazi Holocaust to the killing fields of Cam-
bodia and Rwanda.
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has ex-
pressed concern that “Canada takes the position that com-
pelling security interests may be invoked to justify the re-
moval of aliens to countries where they may face a sub-
stantial risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment.”89 In November 2000, the Committee against Tor-
ture expressed a similar concern and recommended that
Canada “comply fully with article 3(1) of the Convention
prohibiting return of a person to another state where there
are substantial grounds for believing that the individual
would be subjected to torture, whether or not the individual
is a serious criminal or security risk.”90 In its more wide-
ranging study also released last year, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights commented that “[t]he fact
that a person is suspected of or deemed to have some rela-
tion to terrorism does not modify the obligation of the State
to refrain from return where substantial grounds of a real
risk of inhuman treatment are at issue.”91 The Commis-
sion gave particular attention to the procedural inadequa-
cies inherent in the immigration security scheme.
What should be clear from the foregoing review is that a
parochial discourse of anti-terrorism has been a substitute
for conceptual consistency, coherence, and justice. Non-
citizens have been subjected to standards that fall far short
of the guarantees afforded citizens, and the most basic en-
titlements to equality and security of the person have been
sacrificed on the altar of national security. In most cases,
once an adverse csis report has been issued, even the most
compelling testimony by the person concerned and Her-
culean efforts by counsel have been unable to persuade the
Federal Court that the advice should be discounted. With
each security certificate that the Court has upheld on the
basis of “terrorism” allegations, the government’s strategy
of selective refugee deflection and deterrence, of closing
the borders for some while extending a welcome mat to
others, has been reinforced.
Conclusion
It was a security-conscious, “law and order” Conservative
government that developed the “terrorism” clauses ulti-
mately included in Bill c-86. This was the same govern-
ment that moved the entire Immigration bureaucracy to a
newly created Department of Public Security. Once elected,
the Liberal government swiftly reconfigured the depart-
ment as “Citizenship and Immigration” but endorsed and
sustained the measures introduced in c-86. In his submis-
sion to the Special Committee of the Senate on Security
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and Intelligence (Kelly Committee) in 1998, Ward Elcock,
the director of csis, warned that “the terrorist threat to
Canada—and Canadians—has not diminished.”92 Mr.
Elcock indicated that with perhaps the singular exception
of the United States, there were more international terror-
ist groups active in Canada than in any other country in
the world and that “Canada’s counter-terrorism effort will
never succeed if we allow our borders to become mere sieves
. . . ”93 Reporting in January 1999, the Kelly Committee
agreed that
Canada remains . . . a “venue of opportunity” for terrorist
groups: a place where they may raise funds, purchase arms
and conduct other activities to support their organizations
and their terrorist activities elsewhere. Most of the major ter-
rorist organizations have a presence in Canada. Our geo-
graphic location also makes Canada a favourite conduit for
terrorists wishing to enter the United States, which remains
the principal target for terrorist attacks world-wide.94
It is interesting to note that government does not actu-
ally maintain a reliable record of “terrorist” incidents in
Canada, but csis confirms that there are approximately fifty
organizations and 350 individuals who are “targets” of on-
going intelligence investigations.95 Ironically, even csis ac-
cepts that during the past ten years the number of reported
incidents of politically motivated violence internationally
has declined “notably.”96 More people continue to be killed
and injured every year in traffic and workplace accidents—
and as one observer recently remarked, even by bee
stings97—than by “terrorism” under any definition of the
term. Yet legal and policy discourse on “terrorism” contin-
ues to be informed by a moral panic.98 The anti-terrorism
measures in Canadian immigration law, much like the dra-
conian anti-mugging reforms adopted in the United King-
dom in the 1970s (which focused on members of the Black
community as scapegoats) are the result of the manner in
which the state and the media have constructed and dis-
torted social reality. As Lohrmann indicates, the overall
impact of immigration on the internal security of receiv-
ing countries “tends to be misjudged and overestimated.
Public debates on this issue are often marked by prejudi-
cial stereotyping of the proneness of immigrants toward
crime and deviant behaviour.”99 In the Canadian context
statistics firmly establish that refugees and other immi-
grants commit crimes at rates far below the Canadian-born
population.100 Yet in the past year the isolated incident of
failed refugee claimant Ahmed Ressam crossing the United
States from Canada with explosives in his car became a
flashpoint for concern by the media and government alike
and renewed criticism that the refugee program was to
blame for Canada’s becoming a “safe haven for terrorists.”101
Similarly, in the lead-up to the Supreme Court’s hearing of
the Suresh case later this spring, national media have re-
peatedly rehashed the story of federal Cabinet ministers
attending a community event organized by fact in Toronto,
giving voice to concerns that federal politicians were din-
ing with “terrorists.”102 It is acknowledged that there have
been some serious incidents in Canada, and in this regard
the role of the state in maintaining national as well as in-
ternational security is important. Most people remember
the 1985 Air India flight that originated in Vancouver and
ended in the skies over Ireland with an explosion that killed
all 329 passengers on board—becoming the biggest mass
murder case in Canadian history. However, “counter-ter-
rorism” must not become a blanket justification for vic-
timizing innocent people. As Keely and Russell imply, the
perpetrators must not win by making us like them.
The cold-war efforts of the House Un-American Activi-
ties Committee and Senator Joseph McCarthy to uncover
members of the Communist Party in Hollywood and the
U.S. State Department are widely regarded as witch hunts.
In Canada, more than fifty years later, in the face of in-
creasing concerns about the activities of biker gangs, cer-
tain politicians have demanded that the federal government
declare an outright ban on membership in organized crime
groups. Both the federal Justice Minister and national me-
dia appropriately urged caution.103 The solution wasn’t to
make new laws that trenched on important civil liberties,
but rather to do a better job of enforcing the laws that al-
ready exist.104 That as a society we are unable to marshal
the same logic in support of refugees and other non-citi-
zens in this country is shameful.
As for concrete reforms, the following recommendations
represent a modest attempt. The relatively recent amend-
ments targeting “terrorists” and members of “terrorist” or-
ganizations should be removed from the Immigration Act.
The Federal Court’s jurisprudence in the aftermath of the
c-86 amendments provides ample illustration of the ex-
tent to which application of the term permits an unaccept-
ably wide margin for decisions based on stereotype and
other biases. The Court’s cliché, that “one knows a terror-
ist act when one sees one,” is symptomatic of the lack of
rigour and principle that attempts to apply “terrorism” in
the legal arena necessarily engender. Even if it were possi-
ble, as Chadwick might assert, for Parliament to develop a
more even-handed definition of the term, one that would
provide meaningful and non-discriminatory guidance for
decision makers, there is no need for it. The admissibility
provisions already included in section 19 of the Immigration
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Act are fully adequate to address genuine security concerns
by including within their ambit persons who have com-
mitted unlawful acts in the past as well as those who are
considered likely to engage in acts of violence or unlawful
activities in the future.105
It deserves mention that the Minister has authority pur-
suant to existing legislation to initiate revocation proceed-
ings if information surfaces later to suggest that residence
or citizenship status was conferred improperly.106 A focus
on acts and offences, rather than support for causes, is con-
sistent with international treaty obligations and should go
some way to ensuring that political activists are not caught
in the net. However, for the law to be truly non-discrimi-
natory, its treatment of refugees and immigrants from
conflict-ravaged countries should be explicitly guided by
international humanitarian law. The Immigration Act
should be amended to include reference to the Geneva Con-
ventions Act so that people who have engaged in violent
acts in the context of a legitimate conflict are no longer
criminalized for the mere fact of having been in engaged
in the conflict, either as combatants or civilians. A further
amendment should provide a specific definition for the
term security of Canada, with reference to international le-
gal standards as well as the definition of threat in the csis
Act. While the government seeks to promote international
cooperation in the eradication of violence, the Courts have
an important role in ensuring that comity does not be-
come an all-purpose justification for riding roughshod over
individual rights and undermining legitimate political dis-
sent, at home and abroad. The norms developed in refugee
and criminal law concerning membership, complicity, and
conspiracy should inform all security-related decisions.
Clear policy guidelines articulating these principles would
provide critical assistance to both administrative decision
makers and judges. Under no circumstances should depor-
tation be authorized in circumstances where an individual
is at risk of torture or other serious human rights viola-
tions. In this regard, the Act should be amended to fully
incorporate the obligations of the Convention against Tor-
ture. Finally, the government should redouble genuine ef-
forts to end impunity for international crimes through re-
course to the criminal justice system. Canada’s role in pro-
moting international justice would be immeasurably en-
hanced if the small number of refugees and other non-
citizens who have committed war crimes or crimes against
humanity were prosecuted in Canada, rather than subject
to expulsion. Meaningful implementation of the Crimes
against Humanity and War Crimes Act means there is no
longer an excuse for inaction. Implementation of any of
these recommendations would require a degree of politi-
cal will that appears to be lacking at present. In the coming
months, however, the Supreme Court will be uniquely po-
sitioned to address some of these issues. May the Court be
guided by wisdom and justice.
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